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ABSTRACf 
The objectives of the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) for the countries of 
the Balkan region are generally assumed to be complementary. They both stress and 
condition their support and assistance on the progress that these countries make with 
regards to economic modernization, build-up of social institutions, and respect for 
international law. However, this rhetoric doesn't always match the facts on the ground. 
Often, instead of dealing with a cohesive set of policy recommendations, the countries in the 
region are faced with contradictory alternatives and zero-sum choices. The debate over the 
development of the International Criminal Court (I cq was such a case. It centered on 
whether the countries in the region should exempt US personnel from the jurisdiction of the 
Court while in the country and thus rendering them immune from prosecution for any 
crimes committed for which the US courts were not willing or able to take any action. The 
final outcome was mixed. Three of the countries-Croatia, Serbia (and Montenegro), and 
Slovenia--clecided not to give in to US pressure, while the remaining three-Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and Macedonia-ignored the pleas and threats of the EU and of the 
various international non-governmental organizations and decided to sign Bilateral Immunity 
Agreements (BIAs) with the US. How can one explain such divergent outcomes? I argue 
that the credibility of actors involved played an important role in determining whether 
threats coming from the US or the EU were more credible, thus tipping the scales in favor 
of signing BIAs with the US. However, the issue of threat credibility serves only to narrow 
down the choices of actors. Further determination of the outcome necessitates a look at the 
nature of the security context in which these countries exist and operate. 
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THE I CC DEBATE AND THE EU-US STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE: 
THE CAsE OF THE BALKAN-61 
"On one hand there is the national consensus in favor of 
integration in the European family; and on the other hand, 
are strategic security interests ... and the liberation of a 
nation cut in half over a century ago ... When it comes to 
difficult choices, the policy-makers can not make the 
national interest and pragmatism subservient to public 
opinion." By Marko Bello-Albanian Deputy Defense 
Minister, 26 May 2003. 
INTRODUCfiON 
The objectives of the European Union and the United States for the countries of the Balkan 
region are generally assumed to be complementary. They both stress and condition their 
support and assistance on the progress that these countries make with regards to economic 
modernization, build-up of social institutions, and respect for international law. However, 
this rhetoric doesn't always match the facts on the ground. Often, instead of dealing with a 
cohesive set of policy recommendations, the countries in the region are faced with 
contradictory alternatives and zero-sum choices. The debate over the development of the 
International Criminal Court was such a case. 
The Rome Treaty of 1998 signaling the creation of the International Criminal Court and its 
ratification by the 60"' signatory four years later marked the climax of the trend toward 
individualism in international criminal, humanitarian, and human rights law, which had 
started fifty years earlier. However, the creation of the ICC was not equally welcomed and at 
times, it was violently opposed. The United States, already engaged in the global war on 
terror and preparing for an offensive policy aimed at the reconfiguration of the broader 
Middle East, worried that the creation of the I CC was fraught with risks for its vast military 
presence abroad. 
On the other hand, for the European Union and most of its member states, not to mention 
the myriad of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), its creation was the realization of a 
decades-long effort aimed at increased accountability of individuals, irrespective of 
nationality, before a world tribunaL Consequently, the fierce debate that followed should 
have been of no surprise. Unfortunately, caught in the middle were some countries too 
weak or too dependent, or both, on the US and the E U for political support as well as 
economic and military aid, to make a principled stand regarding the finer-yet vitally 
important-points of the debate. The countries of the Balkan region-Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia (and Montenegro), and Slovenia-found 
themselves in this unenviable position of having to make what turned out to be highly risky 
1 The author wishes to thank the American Consortium on European Union Studies for its financial support 
and the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at the George Washington University in 
Washington D.C., where he was in residence as a Graduate Research Fellow when this article was written. The 
author would also like to thank Hope Harrison, Kimberly Morgan, Erik Voeten and participants at an TERES-
sponsored presentation for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies . 
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decisions that were characterized by choices along a Paretto frontier,' i.e. satisfying US 
demands and thereby rejecting EU ones, or vice versa. 
The debate in Brussels, Washington, and the various state capitals, centered on whether 
these countries should exempt US personnel from the jurisdiction of the Court while in the 
country and thus rendering them immune from prosecution for any crimes committed for 
which the US courts were not willing or able to take any action. The final outcome was 
mixed. Three of the countries-Croatia, Serbia (and Montenegro), and Slovenia-decided 
not to give in to US pressure, while the remaining three-Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and Macedonia-ignored the pleas and threats of the EU and of the various international 
non-governmental organizations and decided to sign Bilateral Immunity Agreements with 
the US. How can one explain such divergent outcomes? I argue that the credibility of actors 
involved played an important role in determining whether threats coming from the US or 
the E U were more credible, thus tipping the scales in favor of signing BIAs with the US. 
However, the issue of threat credibility serves only to narrow down the choices of actors. 
Further determination of the outcome necessitates a look at the nature of the security 
context in which these countries exist and operate. 
This paper is divided into five parts. First, I provide a brief overview of the origins and 
creation of the I CC. Second, I discuss the circumstances arising out of the US opposition of 
the jurisdiction of the court and the challenges it presented for the Balkan-6. Third, I 
provide a theoretical explanation borrowing from insights of prospect theory for why the US 
and the EU decided to issue threats in the first place. Then, I present two theoretical views 
on threat credibility to determine the actor whose preferences mattered more and to whom 
the policy choices of the governments of the Balkan-6 countries were directed. Last, three 
main hypotheses are provided and tested for explaining the divergent responses to US 
threats. 
WHAT IS THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? 
Attempts to create an international criminal court date back to the establishment of the 
International Law Commission (ILQ in 1947, which was charged with "the progressive 
development of international law and its codification (Article 1, paragraph 1 of the ILQ.3 
The ILC began laying the foundation for an international criminal court by 1948, but the 
efforts were cut short by the onset of the Cold War! Following a series of events such as 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and civil conflict in various parts 
of Africa, the work on such a court restarted in 1993, when the ILCwas asked by the United 
Nations to "prepare a new draft statute for an International Criminal Court."5 Finally, in 
1998, the UN Diplomatic Conference on Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court met in Rome, resulting in the Rome Treaty, which gave the 
2 Krasner, S. D. "Global Connnunications and National Power: Life on the Paretto Frontier," World PolitUs 43: 
3 (April199!), pp. 336-366. 
3 Day, L. E. and T. Reilly. "The International Criminal Court: A Guide for Giminal Justice Educators," ]ourrnl 
ifCrinirnl ]ustit:e Edumtian 16: 2 (October 2005), pp. 359·378. 
4 Weller, M "Undoing the Global Constitution: UN Security Council Action on the International Criminal 
Court," InterrntiornlAffairs 78, pp. 693·712. 
s Day and Reilly(fnJ). 
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newly created ICC jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity that 
occur after the court's establishment.' 
The treaty provided that until 31 December 2000, it would be open to signature, after which 
date a state could be a party of it only by the fonnal step of ratification.' The 60m ratification 
necessary for the treaty to enter into force was achieved on April1, 2002 and the court came 
into existence on July 1, 2002. As of July 17, 2007, 139 countries had signed the treaty and 
105 had ratified it, with the US and China being among the dissenters.' 
Organizationally, the I CC is independent of the United Nations and operates as an 
independent international organization, although its creation was mandated by the UN. In 
the area of jurisdiction, the ICC continues the trend toward individualism in international 
criminal, humanitarian, and human rights law,' meaning that unlike the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ), the ICC has jurisdiction over persons rather than countries. Further the 
jurisdiction of nation states is always respected, but only insofar as the laner make a good 
faith effort to prosecute the crimes of an accused individual. Otherwise, the I CC has the 
ability to begin a judicial process against the accused. 
Under US pressure, the final text of the treaty reflected three very important changes. First, 
as mentioned, the ICC defers to the national courts whenever the lauer is actively involved; 
second, prosecution can be halted for one year on renewable basis by a UN Security Council 
vote; and third, Article 98 of the Rome Treaty makes provisions for bilateral agreements that 
limit extradition to the I CC of individuals that are citizens of states that are not party to the 
Treaty.10 
Despite such safeguards, the US continues to have outstanding concerns regarding some of 
the treaty provisions that deal with conditions under which cases can be brought to the I CC. 
Instead, the United States preferred a court where cases could be brought only by the 
consent of the country of the nationality of the accused and the country where the crime was 
commined. Further, the US felt that before the case could be brought up to the ICC, it 
should be referred to the UN Security Council for the approval of the investigation, 
prosecution, and trial proceedings." Concerned with its large military footprint in the world, 
the US leaders were apprehensive that the bypassing of the UN Security Council would 
adversely affect its interests and ability to have a say on case selections and risk exposing US 
citizens to politically motivated trials. 
' Galbraith, J. "The Bush Administration's Response to the International Criminal Coun," Berkdey ]oumal c{ 
J!'llem11ioml Law2l (2003), pp. 683-702. 
7 Tucker, R. W. "The International Criminal Coun Controvmy," World Pdicy joumal (Summer 2001), pp. 71-81. 
8 For a complete list of members and those who have abstained from joining the ICC, see Coalition for the 
International Criminal Coun. http:/ /www.iccnow.org/?mod~romesignatures (last accessed October 30, 
2007). 
'Day and Reilly (fn. 3). 
to Galbraith (fn. 6). 
11 For more on this point see Joyner, CC and CC Posteraro. "The United States and the International Court: 
Rethinking the Struggle between National Interests and International Justice," Crimiml Law Forum 10 (1999), 
pp. 359-385; and also Day and Reilly (fn. 3). 
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Unable to convince his European allies, President Clinton signed the Treaty on the last day 
of 2000, noting however that he wouldn't recommend it for ratification in the present form. 
The Bush administration did little about the Treaty until April 11, 2002 when the 60th 
ratification of the Treaty occurred. Before that time, it participated minimally at the ICC 
Preparatoty Sessions in February and September 2001.12 Less than a month after the 
ratification of the Treaty, John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Artns Control and 
International Security sent a letter to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, notifying the 
latter of the intent of the US not to become a party of the Treaty.13 
However, US opposition to the ICC did not end with the 'unsigning' of the Treaty, and 
neither did European efforts to thwart such opposition. Some preparatory steps against 
signatories to the ICC had already been taken even before the ratification of the Treaty, with 
the U.S. Congress taking the lead. These actions have taken three forms: approaching the 
various countries that have ratified the ICC in an effort to conclude Bilateral Immunity 
Agreements, based on Article 98 of the Treaty of Rome that excludes US citizens and 
military personnel from the jurisdiction of the Court; congressionallegislations such as the 
American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASP A) and more recently the Nethercutt 
Amendment, which threatens to cut-off military and economic aid to countries that refuse to 
sign BIAs or that submitted US citizens and military personnel to the jurisdiction of the 
Court; and granting of the ICC immunity blanket to US troops involved in UN Security 
Council-mandated peacekeeping operations. This immunity was extended to the US in July 
2002 and 2003, but following the Abu Ghraib debacle, the US was unable to gamer enough 
votes for the passage of another UN Security Council vote in July 2004.14 
The implementation of this three-pronged strategy on the part of United States, and 
especially the aggressive pursuit of BIAs backed by the threat of aid cut-off, has resulted in 
BIAs signed with 101 governments. However, more than half of the State Parties have 
resisted signing BIAs and 53 countries have publicly refused to do so. Further, only 40% of 
the 101 BIAs have been ratified by the respective parliaments. This dilemma on how to best 
respond to US pressure (as well as pressure from the European Union and NGOs) and the 
subsequent variety of responses to that pressure is also reflected in much of the debate that 
took place in the capitals of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia (and Montenegro), Bosnia and 
Hetzegovina, Macedonia, and Albania. Three of these countries refused to give in to US 
pressure and the other three relented. 
USANDEUPRESSURE ON THE BALKAN-6 
As already mentioned, one of the steps that the US government took to boost its bargaining 
power vis-a-vis other countries in an effort to enter into Article 98 agreements with them 
was the passing of congressional acts, such as ASP A and the Nethercutt Amendment. Both 
ASP A and the Nethercutt Amendment were specifically designed to put pressure on weaker 
countries, since they both excluded NATO and strategic non-NATO allies from the threat 
12 Galbraith (fn. 6). 
n Galbraith (fn. 6). 
14 "Chronology. From 'Signature Suspension' to Immunity Agreements to Darfur," Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court. hrtp:/ I www.iccnow.org/ documents/FS _AMI CC_ US_ Chronology0ct2006.pdf 
(last accessed October 30, 2007). 
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of cutting off aid. In fact, the Dodd Amendment to ASP A provided the US President with a 
great amount of flexibility since it listed as possible mitigating factors cooperation on the war 
on terror or assistance in bringing to justice !mown war criminals. However, the threat of 
economic and military aid cut-off was real. 
Following the 'unsigning' of the Treaty, the US embarked on an aggressive campaign in the 
various capitals of the world with the objective of obtaining immunity guarantees from these 
countries. The Balkans were no exception. For the best part of 2002 and 2003, US officials, 
including Secretary of State Colin Power, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his 
Deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, used a carrot (continued and enhanced economic and military 
assistance and promise of accelerated NATO membership prospects) and stick approach to 
cajole, coerce, and co-op the leaders of these countries into entering in bilateral agreements 
with the US.15 
But the US was not alone in doing so; in fact E U officials and representatives of West 
European governments were equally aggressive in their efforts to convince leaders in 
Albania, Macedonia, and elsewhere in the Balkans that the costs of entering into bilateral 
agreements with the US would be too high, including the possibility of delaying negotiations 
on future membership in the EU. Equally aggressive were a number of NGOs, most notably 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and others, which attempted to "educate" 
the leaders of these countries and provide strategies for resisting US pressure. By the time 
July 1, 2003-the cut-off date for qualifying for US military aid-arrived, three countries-
Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Macedonia-had signed BIAs with the US, while the 
other three had publicly rejected the possibility of any such agreement (see Table 1). 
Table 1. TmU:JifROJreandBIA Ratijiau:ionby O:Juntry(Balkarr6} 
1 Ratifiul 
-----~----- Rejected 
~ ~ ~ 
Rejected 
Rejected 
6]wx:2003 
26 ili 2003 
NA 
NA 
NA 
What explains these clivergent responses? We can look at two possible explanations. First, 
how creclible the actors involved-primarily the EU and the US-were; and second, what 
role clid domestic and! or international factors play in the mind of the decision-makers. 
Before we do so, however, it might be instructive to understand why the US and the EU 
decided that neither of them could just stand by and do nothing in response to each other's 
actions. Doing so, in my view, would shed some light on the question of creclibility as well. 
15 Personal Interviews with Albanian government officials (May-June 2007). 
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PROSPECT THEORY AND US/EU THREAT EXECUTION 
In the field of economics and in the rational choice literature in political science, it is 
assumed that actors try to "maximize their expected utility by weighting the utility of each 
possible outcome of a given course of action by the probability of its occurrence, summing 
over all possible outcomes for each strategy and selecting that strategy with the highest 
utility."16 This utility maximization principle is an essential element of what is known as the 
"expected utility theory" which assumes that an actor's utility for a particular good is a 
function of net asset levels of that good and that preferences over outcomes don't depend 
upon ar:rrent assets.17 Current assets affect marginal utilities and preferences over strategies, 
not preferences over outcomes or terminal states.18 It is generally assumed that all reasonable 
people obey the axioms of the theory and that in fact most people actually do, most of the 
time.19 However, some scholars have noted, Kahneman and Tversky being among the most 
prominent, that there are certain classes of choice problems in which preferences 
systematically violate the axioms of the expected utility theory (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; Levy 1997, Berejikian 2002).20 Why and how does this phenomenon exactly manifest 
itself? Prospect theory seeks to provide an answer. 
Contrary to expected-utility theory, empirical evidence points to the fact that people are in 
fact sensitive to changes in assets, rather than net assets, to gains and losses from a rejereni:e 
point, rather than to levels of wealth and welfare." This reference dependence is one the 
most important insights of prospect theory and a crucial aspect, because it implies that 
people treat gains and losses differently, i.e. they overvalue their losses comparable to gains 
or in other words, they value what they have more than what they don't have, and that the 
"disutility of relinquishing a good is greater than the utility of acquiring it."22 
Three findings are particularly relevant. First, people overweigh outcomes that are 
considered certain, relative to outcomes that are considered only probable. This is also 
referred to as the "certainty effect".23 Second, if we substitute gains with losses in an 
experiment, people become risk averse in the positive (gains) domain, but risk seeking in the 
negative (losses) domain. Last, the resulting value function indicates that "the carriers of 
value are dJang:s in wealth and welfare, not their final states." However, this should not be 
taken to mean that the emphasis on changes as carriers of value discounts the fact that the 
value of a particular change is independent of initial position. Rather, "the initial point 
16 Levy, J. "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations," Intematiow.l Studie; Quarterly 41: 1 
(March 1997), pp. 87-112. 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid. 
19 Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Eromrretrica 47: 2 
(March 1979), pp. 263-292. 
zo Besides Kahneman and Tversky (fn. 19) and Levy (fn. 16), for a good introduction of the evidence see also 
Kahneman D. and A. Tvmky, "Choices, Values, and Frames," ArrerimnPsyJxlo;jst 39 (April1984), pp. 341-50; 
and Kahneman, D., J.L. Knetsch, and RH Thaler, "The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo 
Bias," jourrnl if Erommic Perspa:tius 5 {Winter 1991), pp. 193-206; for a good summary of the state of field see 
Mercer, J. "Prospect Theory and Political Science," A mual Reriewof Pditical Sdenre 8 (Tune 2005), pp. 1-21; and 
Rabin, M, "Psychology and Economics," jourrnl ifE rommic Literaturd6 {1998), pp. 11-46. 
21 Kahneman and Tversky (fn. 19). 
22 Levy (fn. 16). 
23 Allais, M. "Le G:Jmportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque, Gitique des Postulats et Axiomes de 
l'Ecole Americaine," Eromrretrica 21 (1953), pp. 503-546; quoted in Kahneman and Tversky (fn. 19). 
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serves as an indicator of the magnitude of change from a reforent point that is determined by 
the current asset position. The value function then is defined on deviations from reference 
point; generally concave for gains and commonly convex for losses; and steeper for losses 
than for gains."24 
While there is ample experimental and anecdotal evidence that such anomalies indeed 
manifest themselves when people are weighing choices, prospect theory has come under 
criticism from the rational choice camp. Levy lists several of these criticisms, of which I 
discuss two. First, there is the concern that since international relations deals mostly with 
strategic state interaction rather than individual preferences, it is not clear how transferable 
the theory might be. Second, and more crucially, it is unclear how an actor defines one's 
reference point. Since determining the reference point has direct consequences on whether 
a country should be categorized under the losses or gains column, each of which would 
predict different outcomes, determining the reference point would be crucial. If one cannot 
objectively and scientifically determine a reference point then, the appeal of prospect theory 
becomes limited and the model unusable. We will return to the framing problem or the 
determination of the reference point at a later juncture. Here, we will deal with the issue of 
translating insights from prospect theory into the field of international relations. 
While much work has been done on the topic,25 of particular interest for the issue at hand is 
the recent literature that brings prospect theory and deterrence theory together.26 The basic 
argument is similar to what has already been laid out above, i.e. a state would forego gains in 
favor of the status quo if in the gains frame; and therefore if the state were shown to defect 
against the status quo, we would expect to find it in the losses frame. This insight can be 
translated into deterrence theory, by simply asserting that "deterrence is more likely to be 
effective when both states are in the gains frame (since interested in the status quo by virtue 
of valuing what you currently have more than what you can have in the future) and less likely 
when either or both are in the losses frame (since the state in the losses frame will display 
risk seeking behavior)."27 
Several empirical findings from the deterrence literature are in line with this prediction. For 
example, the fact that powerful states often fail to deter weak states (when the larter are in 
the losses column) is confirmed by this theory of cognitive deterrence. Likewise, the finding 
that excessive bullying diminishes deterrence since it might push the state being bullied into 
the losses column is also consistent with prospect theory-based deterrence model." 
Of the three deterrence scenarios Berejikian outlines, the model he develops for unilateral 
deterrence bears particular importance for our case. In this model, unilateral deterrence 
exists where one state is satisfied with the status quo and another is not, i.e. status quo player 
24 Kahneman and Tversky(fn. 19). 
25 In addition to the sources listed in fn. 20, for case studies see Taliaferro,]. W. Balarring Risks: Grrut Pmrer 
Inlerlmtion m the Periphery, Comell Studies in Security Affairs {Ithaca: Comell University Press, 2004), 320 pp; 
Famham, B. R Roa;eud.t ard the MunUh Crisis: A Study if Pditiad Detisian.Making (Princeton University Press, 
2000), 328 pp; and Berejikian, J. "A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence," ]ourrnl if Pwx Researrh 39: 2 {2002), pp. 
165-183. . 
"Berejikian,]. (fn. 25). 
27 ibid. 
28 ibid. 
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(Y) is in the gains frame and the non-status quo player (X) in the losses column (see Table 
2a).29 If X defects, Y is faced with the choice of capitulating or executing its deterrent threat. 
Initially, conditions favor X Because Y is risk averse, it is less likely to risk open conflict in 
an attempt to return to a more favorable position. 
However, according to Berejikian, defection by X will change Y's assessment of the status 
quo. That is, the payouts in Table 2a demonstrate that an attack by X will pitch Y into the 
upper right quadrant, and thereby into a losses frame. Y can accept the cettain losses in the 
new status quo that resulted from X's provocation, or it can retaliate. Retaliation involves a 
high probability of even further losses (the bottom right quadrant), but there is also the 
chance that the conflict might ultimately be resolved in favor of Y. 
Ta!de 2a 
O>operate 
Defect 
It can be argued that this model would predict that states always carrying out their 
deterrence threat every time. However, while states do sometimes carry out their deterrence 
threats, they do not always do so. Consider Table 2b. Here, the object of dispute between 
states - redressing of a grievance- has less strategic importance for Y than for X. Indeed, 
setting right the grievance is a necessary condition of an acceptable status quo for X, but this 
is not so for Y. Under these conditions, defection by X will not elicit retaliation from Y 
because it remains in a gains frame and is risk averse. 
Ta!de 2b 
Cooperate 3,-1 
Defect 
4,-2 
Now, let's return to the case of the United State and its decision to issue the threat to cut off 
aid, thereby signaling its opposition to the efforts of the European Union. Before we can 
draw the proper conclusions from the models discussed above, we have to first deal with the 
issue of the reference point, which Levy noted was a vexing issue for prospect theory. To 
solve the dilemma I use two different examples with two different reference points, which 
29 Tables 2a and 2b presented here have been reproduced faithfully from Berejikian's modeling of deterrence. 
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put the US in the status quo (gains) frame and in the non-status quo (losses) frame, 
respectively. 
The traditional approach to solving the issue of the reference point when dealing with 
prospect theory has been to either arbitrarily choose what appears to be a natural equilibrium 
point, or to fix it at the point in which changes begin to take place, meaning when the status 
quo begins to change. This appears to be a very arbitrary process since it is difficult if not 
impossible to accurately estimate such reference points. However, in our particular case, the 
degree of insecurity is much lower considering the visible changes and expressed preferences 
of the actors involved. In addition, as mentioned, by looking at two different reference 
points we can get some collaborative evidence of the dynamics that are at play in this case. 
We start first with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1998. Both the United States and 
the European countries have been engaged up to this point and continue to engage each 
other in making the proper changes to the structural organization of the ICC. Both players 
are said to favor the status quo. However, while the US continues to favor the status quo 
(meaning the lack of the ratification of the Treaty, since it objects to some of the provisions), 
the European countries begin to shift into the losses column, since they consider the status 
quo unfavorable to their interests, the commitment to which they demonstrate by including 
the acceptance of the I CC, as an unofficial part of the t1a]uis aJJm7W111utaire. In this case, we 
find ourselves in the first column, the EU is player X and the US is player Y, in Table 2a. 
As already noted if X (E U) defects, Y (US) is faced with the choice of capitulating or 
executing its deterrent threat. Initially, conditions favor X. Because Y is risk averse (since it is 
in the gains column), it is less likely to risk open conflict in an attempt to return to a more 
favorable position. However, defection by EU will change US' assessment of the status quo. 
That is, the payouts in Table 2a demonstrate that an attack by X will pitch Y into the upper 
right quadrant, and thereby into a losses frame. Y can accept the cettain losses in the new 
status quo that resulted from X's provocation, or it can retaliate. Retaliation involves a high 
probability of even further losses (the bottom right quadrant), but there is also the chance 
that the conflict might ultimately be resolved in favor of Y. In fact, the US does retaliate, 
since as mentioned earlier, it perad1ES its important national interr!Sts at stake, which drives both 
players in the lower right hand side quadrant, i.e. both loosing. Losses can be interpreted as 
either loss of clout or legitimacy over other countries. In our case, leaders and publics from 
all Balkan-6 countries watched with dismay the struggle between the two great powers, 
questioning the genuineness of the latter's manifestation of concern for the former's 
economic development, respect for international law, and political stability. 
The reference point for the second scenario is the moment after the Treaty has been ratified 
on 1 July 2002. In this case, the status quo players here are the European countries (player 
Y) and the non-status quo player is the United States (player X). The US, being in a losses 
frame (since it finds the Treaty ratification unacceptable), is said to be risk seeking, and 
therefore decides to defect (Table 2b). The EU on the other hand is in the gains column, 
therefore risk averse. However, unlike the first scenario, the E U still finds itself to be in the 
gains frame even after the US has defected, and therefore doesn't take any significant or 
credible action to execute it threat. The reason for this is because the attainment of BIAs is 
a necessary condition for an acceptable status quo for the US, while the E U is willing to live 
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with the new status quo, since its concerns are more normative and not related to important, 
if not vital national security matters. 
To sum up, prospect theory provides an invaluable insight into why countries decide to take 
action or remain passive in the face of sttuctural changes. By framiog the US first in the 
gains and then in the losses frame, we can account for US' response to structural changes. 
We have done a similar task in the case of the European countries. Reruming to the puzzle 
that we posed at the beginning of this section, i.e. how US preference for an aggressive 
diplomatic campaign and its refusal to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC over its citizens 
came to be, we are now able to present a plausible explanation. 
The push for the ratification of the Rome Treaty on the patt of the EU drove the US toward 
risk-seeking behavior, thereby causing it to prefer a confrontational approach despite the risk 
of alienating a large segment of the international community and especially its allies, and 
incur loss of reputation. The European countries on the other hand, besides having lost the 
deterrence gamble with the US in the first iostance, relented. Understanding this dyoamic 
sheds light iota how high the signiog of the BIAs was in the US agenda and how far the EU 
was williog to go to prevent countries from signing these agreements with the US. Both of 
these insights enrich our understanding of whose threat was more credible and why. These 
are the questions to which we turn next. 
MODE LING THREAT CREDIBILITY 
Two views on Credibility of Threat 
Credibility of threat can be defined as "the perceived likelihood that the threat will be carried 
out if the conditions that are supposed to trigger it are met."30 Theoretical discussions on 
credibility of threat are many, but they fall under two general rubrics, both of which differ on 
the degree to which they put emphasis on the role reputation plays in the model. 
View 1: 'Past Actions" Theory 
"Past actions" theory holds that credibility depends on one's record for keepiog or breaking 
commitments." The ability to make commitments or take actions that influence future 
payoffs would also help to determine an actor's reliability.32 Reputation, on the other hand, is 
the estimation of the consistency over time of an attribute or actor's actions.33 It is an 
aggregate composite of all previous transactions over the life of the actor, and requires 
consistency of an actor's action over a prolonged period of time.34 Reputation works 
through signaling: intentions, commitments, and motives and is established when those 
signals are carried out. If an actor is uncertain about the motive or iotentions of someone 
30 Press, D. G. "The Credibility of Power. Assessing Threats during the "Appeasement" Crises of the 1930s," 
lnJermtional SffWily29: 3 (2004), pp. 136-169. For a more lengthy treatment of the subject see also Press, D.G. 
Caladatin;, Cmlibilil:y H(Rf)Leaders Assess Military Thrruts, (lthaca: Comell University Press, 2005), 218 pp. 
3! ibid. 
32 So bel, J. "A Theotyof Credibility," TheReliewifE~ Studies 52:4 (October 1985), pp. 557-573. 
33 Herbig, P. and J. Milewicz. "The Relationship of Reputation and Credibility to Brand Success," Pricin;, Straugy 
andPractia:5: 1 (1997), pp. 25-29. 
34 ibid. 
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upon whom she must depend or to whose threat one must respond, the extent to which one 
trusts the other or perceives the threat as credible, will be based on the partner's or 
opponent's earlier actions. Therefore, a country with a history of broken commitments will 
be considered irresolute, and its new threats will not be believed. 
View 2: ''Current Calculus "Theory 
The "current calculus" theory holds that decision-makers evaluate the credibility of an 
adversary's threats by assessing the balance of power and the interests at stake in a given 
crisis.35 Thus the "current calculus" theory asserts that a country's credibility does not 
depend on a history of keeping commitments, rather on the prevailing capacity of the actor 
to carry out the threat, as well as the importance of the issue at hand. If an adversary that 
issues the threat and has the power to carry it out is perceived as having vital or important 
interests at stake, then the threat will be believed, even if the country has bluffed in the past. 
In this case, vital interests would be those interests that deal with state survival, while 
important interests relate to issues that deal with real material value that do not threaten the 
survival of a country. If the threatened action would likely result in failure or be very costly, 
and if the potential for gains would in all probability be small, the threat will be dismissed. 
Theory and the Balkans 
The question here is no longer whether the threat will be executed or not. We dealt with this 
aspect in section on prospect theory. Instead, here we are interested in the question of how 
countries react once a threat has been executed, but not yet carried out.36 How do US threats 
measure up against the EU ones in the case of the ICC in the six countries we have been 
looking at? In other words, did either actor, based on reputational or current calculus 
assertions, have the upper hand? Empirical evidence points to the fact that threats from the 
US were more likely to be believable relative to the EU.37 This doesn't mean that EU threats 
were seen as without a basis, however in the context of US threats US threats were perceived 
as more credible. A few examples might illustrate the point. 
First, as "past action" theory predicts, previous failures or successes in carrying out 
commitments and especially threats, will tend to reinforce the reputation of the threat-issuer. 
The US Congress had signaled early on that it was willing to cut off aid to any country that 
would not sign BIAs, and in what became later known as the "Hague Invasion Act'', the 
Congress gave the President the authority to use all means, including force, to repatriate any 
Americans that would be extradited by states that were party to the Treaty. It did so in 2002, 
before the Bush Administration had even "unsigned'' the Treaty. By contrast, EU actions in 
the past indicated that they were wlling to compromise on certain points. BIAs derive their 
name from Article 98 which was included in the Rome Treaty and which was negotiated 
between the Europeans and the Americans for just such bilateral agreements. Therefore, 
European threats that "signing such agreements ran counter to the spirit of the mquis 
35 Press, D.G. (fn. 30). 
36 It might seem that there is no difference between executing a threat and carrying it out. In fact, the former 
only means that a threat has been issues (e.g. if country A doesn't do what country B wants, it W1l withhold 
financial assistance), while the laner means that country B has in fact "Withdrawn aid. 
37 Personal Interviews in Albania (May-June 2007). 
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wrromnautairr!' while all the way having opened the way for them, were seen as empty. More 
important, in early 2002, the US was able to force on the UN Security Council, against the 
vocal opposition of its European allies, a provision, which as noted above, granted US 
troops involved in UN Security Council-mandated peacekeeping operations an ICC 
immunity blanket. The Europeans initially opposed it, but relented after the US tied funding 
for the Bosnian peacekeeping to the passing of this resolution. 
On the other hand, from the "current calculus" theory we would expect the US threat to be 
more crechble relative to the EU, if the interests at stake were of a more immediate urgency 
to the US relative to the E U. The evidence again, points in favor of the US. First, it was 
clear that very important US interests were at stake. There was the issue of sidestepping, and 
thereby potentially weakening the UN Security Council, a forum that the US views as 
worthwhile preserving since it enables the US to have a veto-yielding power. 
Further, given the vast US military presence overseas, the US felt that the ICC would result 
in tying the hands of US military personnel and officials to take actions, which they viewed 
to be in their self-interest. For the Europeans, the support for the ICC was a nonnative one 
and not necessarily aimed at deterting the US, rather other countries or military leaders that 
were suspected for committing war crimes and genocide. Therefore, the signing of the BIAs 
was not perceived to have fatally undermined the Treaty since the ICC would still be able to 
carry out its essential missions. There was of course a nonnative preference, dealing with 
the legitimacy of the Court, but this was not perceived to be as important as national security 
interests of the US that were at play.38 
While both the EU and the US might have both been perceived as being able to carry out 
their respective threats, the fact that these countries were in the EU's backyard, also affected 
the cakulations. The US could afford to cut-off aid and derail the NATO membership 
process for these countries without suffering immediate consequences, perhaps with the 
exception of the withdrawal of some troops from the theatre in Afghanistan, which would 
have been marginal and mostly of symbolic importance. However, the EU could ill-afford 
instability in the Balkans or shouldering alone the funding of peacekeeping missions in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in Kosovo. Also, the US officials categorically excluded 
any chance of compromise, whereas E U officials equivocated and in fact provided excuses 
for Balkan-6 members, which in the words of the President of the European Parliament 
"were not to be blamed" if they caved in to US pressure.39 
From the above evidence it is clear that, overall, US threats were more credible relative to 
E U ones. However, issuing a credible threat doesn't guarantee compliance with one's 
demands. Otherwise, all six Balkan countries should have agreed to sign BIAs with the US. 
Why didn't they? 
38 Personal Interviews in Albania (May-June 2007). 
39 During my personal interviews with Albanian government officials, this issue of EU not following up with its 
threats came up often. Some had been present in meeting with EU parliamentarians or Commissioners where 
the position of the EU was the only one to shoulder the blame should be the US and that there was little the 
Albanian government could do. 
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EXPLAINING CROSS-COUNTRY VARIATIONS 
In this paper, I have argued that perceptions of threat credibility played an important role in 
the subsequent responses that these countries gave. However, the credibility of threat is a 
constraining factor, rather than a decisive one. In other words, the final outcome might 
have been different had the credibility of actors played out differently, but we are still left 
with the question of divergent outcomes. Explanations that move us along in the direction 
of a satisfactory solution to the puzzle vary. Some have suggested that developments at the 
domestic level, i.e. the need to hold together coalition allies or the pressure of upcoming 
elections, are the primary causal factors for the policy outcome. 
Tills explanation is problematic however, and dips too early at second image accounts. It 
wouldn't be too difficult in fact to test it. First, it must be acknowledged that, as stated 
earlier, the decision whether to sign a BIA with the US or not, was not one that involved 
sup-optimal Paretto frontier choices, rather zero-sum ones. Whether one signed a BIA or 
not, it was clear that some consequences would follow. In the case of not giving in to the 
US, the threat of the suspension of both US military and economic aid was real and would 
have real consequences for the respective country's hopes of joining the NATO in the near 
future. The EU threat was vaguer and less convincing, but real nevertheless. 
Then, how can we evaluate the domestic level of analysis explanation? Two possibilities 
seem particularly relevant, without having to delve too deeply in the political rhetoric of the 
domestic political bargaining. First, it would be safe to assume that the interests of 
governmental officials, in a parliamentary democratic system, are closely tied to their 
reelection fortunes. As such, both the likelihood of continued economic growth or 
distribution of economic benefits to their constituencies, as well as the level of support on 
the part of the electorate for the US and/ or the EU would affect the position of the elected 
officials relative to one or the other. The following could be one way we could pose the 
aforementioned observations. 
H 1: 1be greater the armunt if aid rereiwd from the US relatir.e to theE U, the greater the likelihocd if 
cwperation W.th the US. 
H 2: 1be m:rre sympathetic the puliic attitudes are tmmrd the US relatir.e to the E U, the greater the 
likelihocd if cwperation W.th the US. 
While the data on both issues is generally not very good, what is available can be of some 
benefits for drawing some general lessons. Tables 3a and 3b contain data regarding the 
amount of aid given to the Balkan-6 by the US and the EU respectively from year 2000-
2003. It is likely that the amount of aid given to the region is greaterthan the one presented 
here, but we are safe to assume that the patterns in the correct amount resemble those seen 
here. Exactly what are these patterns? 
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One conclusion we can draw is that the EU is much better and more generous at giving aid 
to the region across the board than the US. This should not come as a smprise considering 
the proximity of the region to the EU relative to the US. While G-oatia did receive almost 
twice as much from the EU than from the US, Bosnia and Herzegovina also received a 
considerably larger amount of aid from the EU than from the US. Further, the gap between 
EU and US aid to G-oatia for the period from 2000 to 2005 was due largely to the deatth of 
US assistance for the period from 2000 to 2001. The cases of Slovenia and Serbia do seem to 
support some preliminary conclusion that perhaps the amount of financial assistance is tied 
to level of support for one actor relative to the other. However, we are still left wondering 
why countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina didn't draw the same conclusion that G-oatia et 
al did. Further, considering that the likelihood of the E U executing its threat was lower than 
the US one, it was very unlikely that the EU would drastically reduce assistance directed at 
these countries. 
How about the second hypothesis? How do levels of support for the US compare with those 
of the E U in these countries? There are different ways to measure this support. Ideally, we 
would have access to survey data that poses the question in terms of whether one 
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prefers/ favors one actor to the other. However, such data is not forthcoming. Most of the 
polling that has taken place in the region has been either limited to business elites or has 
asked the question in ways that makes it difficult to draw comparisons. 
For the pmposes of testing our second hypothesis, I have selected the polling done by Warid 
Values Stffll!Y (see Table 4a and 4b. There are some costs associated with using the data from 
the survey, not least being the different time periods in which the survey is conducted. 
However, it does provide us with the ability to compare across the six countries. Also, to the 
degree that US pressures were tied to NATO membership prospects, the comparison 
between the EU and the NATO is apt. Then what does the data tell us? 
T aHe 4a. OJrfo/ence TheE UITJflfrln Union 
TaHe4b. OJrfo/ence NATO 
Again, it is difficult to provide support for our hypothesis that support (confidence) for the 
E U or the US (NATO) would have sent the government officials any signals that could have 
been interpreted consistent with their final policy choices. With the exception of Albania (at 
83.9%), the percentage of the population in other countries that had a great deaV quite a lot 
of confidence in the EU never exceeds 50%. According to other surveys, in the case of 
Slovenia and Croatia numbers get better by the end of 2003, but this was due to very intense 
top-down efforts on the part of the respective governments that were interested in a positive 
outcome when putting the question of EU and NATO membership to a vote. 
Very little changes when the question is asked about confidence in the NATO. Here again, 
Albania is the exception with 86.4% saying they have a great deal to quite a lot of 
confidence. Croatia, smprisingly considering the BIA debate, has a majority of the 
population (55.6%) expressing confidence. The number for Slovenia is unchanged at 36.9%, 
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while in both Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, two countries that granted BIAs to 
the US, less than 50% of the population (27.2% and 48.3% respectively) has confidence in 
the NATO. Not surprisingly given their recent experience with the NATO, of those 
surveyed in Setbia (not including Montenegro) only 5.7% had confidence in the 
orgaruzauon. 
It is clear from the above discussion that neither financial assistance nor public opinion give 
sufficiently clear signals that lead to the subsequent course of actions followed by the 
governments of each counuy. This is not to say that domestic determinants of behavior are 
irrelevant, rather by focusing on them too early we might miss other important explanations 
at the systemic level that constrain and account for state behavior. Exactly what could these 
structural constraints be? I propose that the broader security context in which these 
countries operate might tell us quite a bit about whether a countty will choose to sign a BIA 
or refuse to do so. 
We can then suggest a third alternative: 
H 3: The rrure proninent security cunsiderations (indudingfrazen wrflicJs, territorial disputes, and i11ien7td 
instability} are in a wuntry, the grrnter the likelihrxxi that wuntry Wll cooperate wth the us and defect from 
theEU 
Two points are in order here. First, it must be stressed that the NATO and the EU are seen 
as occupying different niches along the economic-security continuum. Second, while we 
might be tempted to see preferences along the economic-security spectrum, or preference 
for earlier membership to the EU relative to the NATO, as a reflection of domestic 
competition, it would seem more apt, considering the evidence, to assert instead that 
structural factors such as the presence or absence of wars and instability are the rrn;t important 
sources that shape domestic preferences. 
While both the EU and the NATO emphasize the need for candidate countries to progress 
along fairly similar trajectories that include political stabilization, economic development, and 
respect for international law: it is also true that the EU is seen primarily as a vehicle for 
economic growth, whereas the NATO is considered mainly as a guarantor and a means of 
achieving security, both domestically as well externally.'0 Certainly, no countty would want to 
choose one or the other, but when faced with a zero-sum choice, a countty where 
(in)security is a more pressing issue relative to economic concerns, will choose to court the 
NATO rather than the EU (and vice versa). 
A mitigating factor, especially when faced with an impossible choice, might be what the 
countty might consider to be the prospects for membership in one organization or the other. 
The case of Albania and Croatia illustrate this point quite well. No doubt that integration 
into the Euro-Atlantic institutional framework is a stated objective of both countries.41 Yet, 
40 Zielonka, J. "Conclusion" in Zielonka, J. and Pravda, Alex ( eds.). Demxratic Gm;didaticm in Eastern E urupe, 
Vol. 2, (Oxford Studies in Democratization: Oxford University Press, 2001), 568 pp. 
41 Croatia came around to this view mostly at the beginning of the new millennium after ending its 
isolationist/ nationalist blend of foreign policy. See I vica Racan, "Croatia and Euro-Atlantic Integration," 
Woodrow Wzlson Gnter Ma?ti"!S Repon # 256,June 6, 2002; 
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between 2000 and 2003, the Albanian government realized that the NATO membership 
track was progressing along at a good speed, while the prospects for E U membership, while 
good, seemed over the horizon. 
As a result, it decided to make good on its offer to the US government regarding the use of 
Albanian troops, airspace, ports, and bases in the context of war on terror, by first sending 
30 special commando troops in Afghanistan and later sending 70 more to Iraq in April2003. 
A year later, when the Spanish government decided to withdraw its contingent of 1300 
troops from Iraq, the Albanian government decided to contnbute another 130 special troops 
that would be based in and around Mosul. In the middle of these developments, Albanian 
efforts seemed to bear fruit when both US Secretary of State Colin Powell and US Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld praised Albanian efforts and promised to increase funding in 
order to speed up Albania's efforts in addressing outstanding membership demands. This 
sentiment was further buuressed by a meeting the North Atlantic Council, headed by 
NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, held in Albania on the membership prospects of 
the country. 
On the European front, Albania's prospects were going well, but at a much slower pace. The 
EU proposed first the new Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for five countries of 
South-Eastern Europe, including Albania in 1999. Finally by June 2003, at the Thessaloniki 
Summit, the SAP becomes confirmed as the EU policy for the Western Balkans, having 
gone through a lengthy process starting with the extension of duty-free access to EU market 
for products from Albania in 2000, to the Feira European Council Gune 2000) stating that 
all the SAP countries are "potential candidates" for EU membership; to the Commission 
recommending the undertaking of negotiations on Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
(SAA) with Albania. The Goteborg European Council Gune 2001) then invited the 
Commission to present draft negotiating directives for the negotiation of a SAA and in 2002, 
Negotiating Directives for the negotiation of a SAP with Albania were adopted. 
Finally on 31 January2003, EU Commission President Romano Prodi officially launched the 
negotiations for a SAA between the E U and Albania (the first step in what will be a lengthy 
process). This protracted process didn't make the Albanian politicians any less anxious for 
joining the EU, but there was a realization, especially in the context of the upcoming 2004 
enlargement and discussion over the prospects of the Turkish membership, that the EU 
enlargement process might have run its course in the short to medium· term.42 
The Croatian story is not unlike that of Albania, except for one important detail: Croatia's 
hopes for membership in both the EU and the NATO as early as 2002 were quite good. In 
his speech on June 6, 2002 at the Woodrow Wuson Center, the then Prime Minister, Ivica 
Racan stated that "Croatia is aware of the fact that it will not be invited to join the Alliance 
at the Prague NATO summit in November 2002. However, Croatia expects to be 
recognized as a strong candidate and a front- runner for the next round of enlargement."" 
He then added with equal optimism that "while making every possible effort to prepare the 
http:/ I www.wilsoncenter.org/ index.cfm?topic _id~ 1422&fuseaction ~topics.publications&doc _id ~7 4 37&grou 
p id~7427 
"-Personal Interviews in Albania (May·June 2007). 
43 R.acan, fn. 41. 
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country for EU membership by 2006, we plan to submit our application for candidacy to the 
E U early next year."44 
Racan's optimism was not unfounded. Croatia first launched the SAP with the EU in 
November 2000 and by 29 October 2001 it had signed a SAA. The Croatian government 
formally applied for EU membership on 21 February 2003 and on April2004, the European 
Commission issued a positive opinion on G-oatia's application for EU membership 
application, followed in June 2004 by a declaration of the European Council confirming 
G-oatia as candidate country. Meanwhile, on the NATO front, the Qoatian government had 
expressed its dissatisfaction with having been grouped with Macedonia and Albania as 
members of the Adriatic Charter, a regional cooperation organization sponsored by the 
NATO, in preparation for future membership in the alliance. 
A source of this dissatisfaction was the fact that the G-oatian government saw the region as 
inherently unstable and wished to distance itself from it, focusing instead on the economic 
integration of the country into the heart of Europe. The thinking was that the international 
community, especially the United States and the EU, would remain involved in the region-
particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina (and Kosovo)-to help them fully achieve integrity, 
independence and integration into the European mainstream,45 while G-oatia would move on 
and away from instability-prone hotspots. It is noteworthy that this policy approach 
accomplished exactly what it set out to do, i.e. increased the prospects of G-oatia's 
membership in the E U. However, certain choices, such as the one dealing with BIAs, had 
consequences beyond EU membership prospects and might have hurt G-oatia's bid for 
joining the NATO at an earlier date. 
We might be tempted to see these preferences for quicker integration into one organization 
over the other as originating wholly from the interaction of different interests at a domestic 
political setting. However, in my view, this is not the case. It would seem more apt, 
considering the evidence, to assert instead that structural factors such as wars and instability 
are sources that shape these domestic preferences. Indeed, if we look at Table 546 there 
seems to be a rough correlation between the incidence of conflict and the decision to sign a 
BIA with the US.47 In other words, countries that have a more heightened sense of 
insecurity, be that from internal or external sources, will prefer a closer relationship with 
NATO and consequently avoid being cut off from aid related to the achievement of that 
goal, relative to traditional economic assistance. 
44 Racan (fn.40). 
4
' Ibid. 
4
' Forthe conflict timeline, I have chosen to highlight time-periods which can be clearly isolated as opposed to 
considering them as in the case of G-oatia between 1991 and 1995 for example one continuous one. The terms 
used for the description of the conflict are also arbitrarily simplified; the purpose being only to evoke some 
notion of what was at stake. 
47 The case of Serbia and Montenegro is the clear outlier and would seem to undermine our argument. In fact, 
it only makes our point that systemic factors constrain behavior of domestic political actors. In most of the 
conflicts Serbia and Montenegro (former Yugoslav Republic) was pitted against the NATO. Hence, the 
decision not sign a BIA with the US is a logical consequence deriving from such factors . 
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T aHe 5: Corflict Timlire 
I~ 
In!emal 
Independence 
Indeed, in the case of Albania (as in the case of all or most countries in the region), the 
modernization and transformation of its military apparatus depends entirely on US-
originated military aid. This aid includes Foreign Military Financing (FMF) that provides for 
clothing, individual equipment, and field equipment for coalition missions, support the 
development of niche military capabilities and help modernize the Albanian military. The 
International Military Education and Training (Il\1E1) program supports Albania's NATO 
aspirations by providing both field and company-grade officers with training and 
professional development opportunities. 
In addition, Il\1E T provides English language training; professional military education for 
officers, tuition for attendance at U.S. military academics; and mobile training teams to assist 
the implementation of human resources, training, and logistics systems reforms. These two 
programs are further complemented by grant transfers related to Excess Defense Articles 
(EDA) directed to Albania's force modernization plan in the context of its NATO 
membership plan; the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS); NADR Anti-
Terrorism Assistance (ATA) aimed at upgrading and financing anti-terrorism efforts; and the 
U.S. Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction Program aimed at shoring up domestic 
instability via the removal of unauthorized weapons. For the FY 2005, this aid amounted to 
US$ 4.5 million, an amount scheduled to increase in subsequent ones.48 This story can be 
retold with very few changes for :Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
It can be argued that the withholding of these funds would have made Albania's quest for 
joining the NATO, and to one degree or the other that of other countries in the region, an 
impossible one. The decision then to sign a BIA or not had real consequences for the 
likelihood of being able to join the alliance sooner rather than later. For Croatia this dilemma 
had real consequences, since albeit closer to becoming a member of the alliance than either 
Albania or :Macedonia, it is now on track to joining the NATO during the same wave of 
enlargement as its two poorer neighbors.49 
48 U.S. State Department. "U.S. Aid to Europe and Eurasia," Burruu if E WOfJ'?L'n and E urasianA Jfairs Rqx;rt 
(2005). hnp:/ /www.state.gov/ documents/ organization/60653.pdf (last accessed October 30, 2007). 
49 Unlike Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia, Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro did not 
receive any funding under either IMET or FMF. Slovenia had already been on track to joining the alliance in 
2004, and therefore was eligible under the rule excepting NATO members for some funding. 
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The argument can be made here also that perhaps Croatia was in less of a need of such 
funding than its southern neighbors and therefore could afford to take such risks. This 
however only reinforces our argument about the effect that the incidence of conflict and 
insecurity can have on a) a country's perception of the risks it can take; and b) the ability to 
move away from a security-dominated paradigm. None of the countries that signed BIAs 
with the United States had made this paradigm shift from a security-dominated foreign 
policy and further, none of them could afford to ignore security considerations. In Albania, 
the experience of the civil unrest verging on civil war of the late 1990s had left the political 
elites shaken and mindful of the crucial role the international community and especially the 
United States had played.50 Moreover, the issue of Kosovo was the 800-pound gorilla in the 
room, which no politician dared to ignore and about which every politician was aware that 
US help and support was indispensable. As the then Deputy Defense Minister opined to the 
Albanian public, when it came to matters of national interest, there was little room for 
political disagreements.51 
On the other hand, in the case of Croatia, the wars of the first half of the 1990s had resulted 
in rather conclusive outcomes, with the outcome being a more stable domestic and external 
security environment. To the degree that external actors continued to stir up the past, as it 
happened in the case of the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia (ICI'Y), this only 
provided even more incentive to respond in a negative fashion to US overtures. Even more 
important, both Croatia's Strate;jt: Deferlf.E Redew 2005 (SDR)52 and its Foreign Pdicy A im53 as 
stated by its mission representatives to the NATO, full membership in the European Union 
is given the place of honor, followed by membership in the NATO. 
Further, the documents also state clearly the Croatian government's perception of risk as 
low. The following is a statement from its SDR, 
The likelihood of a conventional conflict-in which Croatia's territory would be pan of a 
larger battlefield or area of hostilities in the coming ye<m-is very low. A likely aggressor 
that could potentially threaten Croatia's security would do so with conventional means and is 
not expected to possess highly sophisticated military capabilities. 54 
Instead, the focus has shifted into other areas of concern, 
Threats are assuming a new character. In the future, it will be even more difficult to 
distinguish between military and non-military components of threats .... The emergence of 
new threats and risks correspondingly call for military reforms and the development of new 
capabilities. The fact that a direct military threat to Croatia is highly unlikely allows for a 
comprehensive reform of its armed forces. The perception of a very high probability of 
facing asynunetric, trans-national threats and having to deal with complex security issues 
justify the need to develop new, specific and adequate responses.ss 
so Personal Interviews with Albanian government officials (May-June 2007). 
St Bello, M. "Why the Parliament should ratify the Nano-Powell agreement," Gazeta Shdwlli, 26 May 2003. 
52 Ministry of Defence of Croatia, StrategjcDifenxReciew2005. 
53 Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Brussels F arei[!fl Pdicy A im. 
http:/ /nato.mfa.hr/?mh~53&mv~231 (last accessed October 30, 2007). 
54 See fn. 51. 
55 ibid. 
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If we contrast this perception of the environment with that put forth by the Albanian 
National Security Strate;sy 200456 the difference becomes clear. 1his is how the Albanian 
government perceives the threat of anned conflict, 
Threats and dangers of a transnational nature include regional and foreign dangers, in 
themselves. Military force usage, or of force in any other forms that endanger sovereignty, 
independence and integrity of the country, are a cJarw for the Albanian Republic. Regional 
destabilization, throui#J miwl rf dtsire fcrr the rntWrnlistic foling; am ethnic wrflias perfonrurr:e, 
preser11s tramrntWrnl darw fcrr the A IJ:urian Repuldic 57 
Also, with regards to the dangers of domestic instability, the document states that "[p ]olitical 
instability is a risk for the security of the Republic of Albania and protection of national 
interests."58 
It is clear, from the evidence presented above that Albanian and Croatian perceptions of the 
security context in which they exist and operate are different. The argument that I have 
constructed sees such diverging perceptions as a consequence of more systemic differences, 
ones that have their root and! or are related to the incidence of conflict in a particular area or 
country. It is in a way by shaping the perceptions of one's threats and risks that systemic 
factors impinge upon the policy outcomes of different countries. In the case of the Balkan-
6, the divergence among the different policy choices was accentuated by the zero-sum nature 
of those choices. 
CONG.USION 
Most of the current research on the European Union and the United States has focused on 
either areas of convergence or competition. In the latter case, almost always, inordinate 
attention has been paid to trade disagreements between the two countries. Another area of 
research has focused on the relationship between the E U, US, and international 
organizations (IOs) vis-a-vis the newly democratizing countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEECs). However, very little attention has been paid to the intersection of these 
two research agendas, i.e. areas where the E U-US disputes spill over into their relationships 
with CEECs. 
1his essay has attempted to begin addressing this issue by focusing on the way small 
countries, such as Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and others respond to these pressures when 
faced with choices that take place along the Paretto frontier. Whatever the outcome, it is 
obvious that these countries stand to lose from such disagreements. Moreover, the US and 
the E U also stand to lose legitimacy, respect, and influence by treating these countries as 
collateral damage. It is also possible that domestic stability in these countries can be 
jeopardized as a result of delayed reforms and integration. 
Fortunately, many of these instances can be avoided if the EU and the US decide to 
coordinate their policies in the region. One way of approaching this issue of coordination is 
by recognizing that both have compelling interests in the region. The E U certainly by virtue 
56 Republic of Albania. NatWrnl Srocri!:y Strategy 2004. 
57 ibid. emphasis adki. 
58 ibid. 
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of its place and role has the attention of the countries in the region; but many of these 
countries feel equally attracted to the United States and may choose to cooperate with the 
latter rather than with the former on certain issues. This need not be a contentious issue and 
certainly not one that is played out on the backs of these smaller countries . 
. 23. 
REFERENCES: 
Allais, M "Le Comportement de l':Homme Rationnel devant le Risque, Critique des 
Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine," ECfJJ10YI'F!:rim 21 (1953), pp. 503-546. 
Bello, M "\Xi'hythe Parliament should ratify the Nano-Powell agreement," Gazeta Shekulli, 26 
May2003. 
Berejikian, J. "A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence," journal if P= ReseardJ 39: 2 (2002), pp. 
165-183. 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court. "Rome Treaty Signatories" 
http:/ I www.iccnow.org/?mod=romesignatures 
=-....,--,....~---..,· "Chronology: From 'Signature Suspension' to Immunity Agreements to 
Darfur" http:/ I www.iccnow.org/ documents/FS _AMI CC_ US_ Chronology0ct2006.pdf 
Day, L. E. and T. Reilly. "The International Criminal Court: A Guide for Criminal Justice 
Educators," Journal ifCrininal]ustia: Edumtion 16: 2 (October 2005), pp. 359-378. 
Farnham, B. R. Roosl?lE!t and the Munid? Crisis: A Study if Pditical Decisim-Makin;, (Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 328 pp. 
Galbraith, J. "The Bush Administration's Response to the International Criminal Court," 
Berkeley Journal if International Law21 (2003), pp. 683-702. 
Joyner, C. C. and C.C. Posteraro. "The United States and the International Court: Rethinking 
the Struggle between National Interests and International Justice," Crininal Law Forum 10 
(1999), pp. 359-385. 
Herbig, P. and J. Milewicz. "The Relationship of Reputation and Credibility to Brand 
Success," Pricin;, Strategy and Practice 5: 1 (1997), pp. 25-29. 
Levy, J. "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations," International Studies 
Quarteriy41: 1 (March 1997), pp. 87-112. 
Kahneman, D., J.L. Knetsch, and R. H Thaler, "The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, 
and Status Quo Bias," Journal ifEconarric Perspeai'l£5 5 (Wmter 1991), pp. 193-206. 
Kahneman, D. and A Tversky. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," 
ECfJJ10YI'F!:rim 47:2 (Jvlarch 1979), pp. 263-292. 
----::-cc:-:c::----· "Choices, Values, and Frames," A m:rimn PS)fhdoist 39 (April 1984), 
pp. 341·50. 
Krasner, S. D. "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Paretto Frontier," 
WaridPditics 43: 3 (April1991), pp. 336-366 . 
. 24. 
Mercer, J. "Prospect Theory and Political Science," Annual Redew if Prlitiml Sdena: 8 Gune 
2005), pp. 1-21. 
Ministry of Defence of Croatia, S trategjc Defena; Redew 200 5. 
Mission of the Republic of Ooatia to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Brussels 
FureignPrlicyAim. http:/ /nato.rnfa.hr/?mh=53&mv=231 
Personal Interviews May-June 2007 
Press, D. G. "The Oedibility of Power. Assessing Threats during the "Appeasement'' Crises 
of the 1930s," Intematicma1Sff.Wity29: 3 (2004), pp.136-169. 
~.,---------,-----c;c· Calculating Oedibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, (Ithaca: Comell 
University Press, 2005), 218 pp. 
Rabin, M, "Psychology and Economics," Journal ifE wnnnic Literaturr! 36 (1998), pp. 11-46. 
Racan, I. "Ooatia and Euro-Atlantic Integration," Wooirow Wzlson Center Mff!ti:ng, Report 
# 256, June 6, 2002. 
http:/ I www. wilsoncenter.org/ index.cfm?topic _id= 14 22&fuseaction =topics .publications&d 
oc _id=7437&group _id=7427 
Republic of Albania. National Srotrity Strategy 2004. 
Sobel, J. "A Theory of Oedibility," 7be RedewifEwnnnic Studies 52: 4 (October 1985), pp. 
557-573. 
T aliaferro, J. W. B~ Risks: Great Pmu:r lnter7.enlion in the Periphery, Camel! Studies in 
Security Affairs (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 2004), 320 pp. 
Tucker, R W. "The International Criminal Court Controversy," World Prlicy Journal (Summer 
2001), pp. 71-81. 
U.S. State Department. "U.S. Aid to Europe and Eurasia," Bureau if European and Eurasian 
A ffoirs Reparts (2005). http:! I www.state.gov/ documents/ organization/60653 .pdf 
Weller, M "Undoing the Global Constitution: UN Security Council Action on the 
International Criminal Court," International A ffoirs 78, pp. 69 3-712. 
Zielonka, J. and A Pravda (eds.). Derrrx:ratic Consrlidation in Eastern Europe, Vol. 2, (Oxford 
Studies in Democratization: Oxford University Press, 2001), 568 pp. 
- 25-
